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1. Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against
Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9, 11 (1984) (encouraging a “new understanding of the fact
that privileged corporate information is a valuable asset in the nature of a property interest”); Donna
M. Nagy, Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Liability: A Post-O’Hagan
Suggestion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1223, 1267 (1998) (noting that many legal scholars reject a property-
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Some scholarship relies on economic analysis aimed at determining which
allocation of rights in information will generate the greatest efficiency or
liquidity in U.S. securities markets. Other scholarship attempts to reconcile the
perceived incoherence or vagueness in the law using doctrinal analysis.
However, almost everyone seems to miss the fact that under the classical theory
officials have consistently predicated legal liability, in part, on the violation of
the property rights of the information owner and have explicitly recognized the
issuing corporation as the owner of the information.
In 1961, in the first administrative case imposing liability for insider trading,
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) explained that the
defendants were penalized for two reasons. First,
the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to
information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and
not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent
unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such information
knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.2
By predicating liability in part on the violation of the issuing company’s
exclusive use rights in inside information, the SEC identified a property
principle as an animating feature of the doctrine. The U.S. Supreme Court
adopted the SEC’s two-part justification almost verbatim when it published its
first insider trading decision in 1980.3 Moreover, despite eliminating the
rights rationale because “the goal of protecting property rights in secret information lies outside the
zones of interest of the federal securities laws”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Under
the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, 19 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1, 40 (1993) (assessing
whether transaction attorneys should be allocated a property right in deal information, and
concluding that prohibiting such an allocation would protect “the client’s incentive to develop
valuable information and…save the parties from engaging in costly and unnecessary
negotiations”); Sung Hui Kim, Insider Trading as Private Corruption, 61 UCLA L. REV. 928, 977
(2014) (describing a property rationale as “a compelling normative approach to insider trading, but
it lacks sufficient descriptive power”); Richard W. Jennings, Insider Trading and the Stock Market,
55 CAL. L. REV. 1229, 1234 (1967) (book review) (arguing that the prohibition is justified as a
means of protecting the property rights of shareholders, who he describes as the ultimate owners of
the information); Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of Insider Trading, 78
TEX. L. REV. 375, 436 (1999) (using a property rationale to describe insider trading as a species of
“wrongful conversion,” and therefore supporting the prohibition on insider trading and rejecting
the notion that shareholders’ are able to consent to the use of inside information in securities
trading); Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the
Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 314, 317–18, 321 (1981) (advocating the
treatment of insider trading as a species of the law regulating business information and warns
against allowing the doctrine to be pigeonholed as securities law); see generally Gary Lawson, The
Ethics of Insider Trading, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 727 (1988) (using a framework based on
Aristotle’s moral theory and John Locke’s property theory to evaluate the practice of insider
trading).
2. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (Nov. 9, 1961) (emphasis added).
3. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980) (stating that an insider’s duty to
disclose or abstain from trading “arose from (i) the existence of a relationship affording access to
inside information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of
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“exclusive use” language, the Court continued to refer to the defendant’s
unauthorized use of confidential business information when it last explained
why liability is imposed in classical theory cases.4 The Court has previously
stated that confidential business information “has long been recognized as
property.”5
As a consequence of missing the role of property in insider trading law, issues
related to the legitimacy of the doctrine have been overlooked. Many scholars
have noted the ways in which insider trading doctrine departs from the expected
features of a property regime.6 Several have noted that the inability of
information owners to license inside information for trading in securities
markets is a dramatic departure from the common elements of a property
regime.7 Others have raised concerns that imposing controlling person liability
on information owners looks a lot like blaming the victim of theft for his own
victimization.8 Yet little has been said about how departures from property
principles might undermine the authority of officials to impose liability for
insider trading.9 If the violation of property rights is used as a justification to
impose liability for insider trading, then it would be reasonable to expect
common and long-standing property principles to at least partially control the
scope and limits of the law.
Scholars and lawmakers should be deeply concerned about the legitimacy
issues raised by the departures from property principles in the law.10 When a
law restricts the exercise of specific rights while being described as protecting
allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that information by trading without disclosure.”)
(emphasis added).
4. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997). Although the Court in O’Hagan
does not explicitly identify the violation of rights of exclusive use and benefit, it did continue to
describe the classical theory as in part premised on the insider’s use of information. Id.
5. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25–26 (1987) (citations omitted).
6. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice
Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 S.M.U. L. REV. 1589, 1591 (1999) (arguing that
“the SEC’s regulatory jurisdiction over insider trading meant that the problem was treated as a
species of securities fraud rather than one of property rights”); Roberta S. Karmel, The Relationship
Between Mandatory Disclosure and Prohibitions Against Insider Trading: Why A Property Rights
Theory of Inside Information is Untenable, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 149, 173 (1993) (arguing that the
property and other private law limitations on the prohibition articulated by the Supreme Court in
Chiarella and Dirks were “simply inadequate to cover the fact patterns of cases in which some have
been enjoined by the SEC or have even gone to prison”); see Nagy, supra note 1, at 1321; see also
Kim, supra note 1, at 975–77.
7. See Kim, supra note 1, at 955; see also Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 36–37.
8. See JOHN P. ANDERSON, INSIDER TRADING: LAW, ETHICS, AND REFORM 108–112
(2018); see also JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND POLICY
65–66 (1991) (concluding that “it is generally the employer who is harmed by the insider trading”).
9. But see, Richard A. Epstein, Returning to Common-Law Principles of Insider Trading
after United States v. Newman, 125 YALE L.J. 1482, 1512–1515 (2016) (questioning the legitimacy
of Regulation FD and other gap fillers).
10. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 63–79 (1969); Raff Donelson, Legal
Inconsistencies, 55 TULSA L. REV (2019).
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the same rights, it makes judges and enforcement officials look incompetent at
best. Worse, it suggests that some officials are hiding their true motives.
Questions about the authority of insider trading law are more than abstract
problems. Targets of the prohibition face decades in prison and the confiscation
of millions of dollars. The longest criminal sentence imposed under the
prohibition, eleven years, was given to Raj Rajaratnam in 2011.11 Rajaratnam
was also fined ten million dollars.12 If his conviction was for violating a
prohibition that premises liability on infringing on some party’s property rights
in information, then it would make sense that he would have had the opportunity
to raise a defense based on receiving the consent or ratification of the
information owners.13 Without those options, insider trading decisions look
more like the employment of vice laws or inalienability rules than the application
of property doctrine.14
Anyone concerned with the overarching public policy objective of fostering
the rule of law should want the principles used to justify liability to help define
the limits of the authority to impose liability. Unless other valid and coherent
principles of insider trading can explain the departures from property doctrine,
courts, and enforcement officials should reconsider imposing liability for the
practice. If valid and competing principles do exist in the doctrine, then they
should be clarified.
With these concerns in mind, Part I describes the relevant elements of the
federal insider trading regime. The analysis includes a discussion of the
difference between the classical theory and the misappropriation theory of
insider trading liability, as well as the requirements of tipper and tippee liability.
Part II demonstrates that when described as a means of remedying fraud, the
prohibition of insider trading has always relied in part on the violation of some
party’s property rights in order to impose liability. In its first fraud-based insider
trading case, the SEC laid out a legal test that premises liability in part on the
fact that a trader makes use of “information intended to be available only for a
corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone.”15 The U.S.
Supreme Court later adopted this legal test in Chiarella.16 This property-based
justification only became more prominent over time, with the introduction of the
11. United States v. Rajaratnam, No. S-2:09 Cr. 01184, 2011 WL 6259591, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 20, 2011).
12. Id.
13. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS §§ 892–892D, 896–900 (AM. LAW. INST. 1977)
(Division 12 of the Restatement categorizes consent and discharge as two of several defenses
applicable to all tort claims).
14. See PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 3 (1965) (discussing and
ultimately rejecting the proposition that unless we want to equate ‘religious sin’ and ‘crime,’ then
“there must remain a realm of private morality and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms,
not the law’s business.”); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092–1093 (1972).
15. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14, at 912.
16. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 241–42 (1980).
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misappropriation theory of liability. Part III explores the scholarship that has
either advocated for or opposed a greater reliance on property principles in future
iterations of the U.S. regulation of insider trading. The analysis will show that
many accept an unnecessarily strong distinction between property doctrine and
other doctrinal areas in American law.
Part IV provides an overview of the implications of property principles
consistently animating insider trading law. First, this Section will provide a
detailed discussion of the issues raised by the failure to adhere to the longstanding elements of a property regime, focusing on the constitutional and
statutory interpretation problems that emerge as a result. Second, the clear
reliance on property doctrine and the failure to adhere to property principles
suggests potential explanations for the incoherence in insider trading doctrine
described by many scholars and enforcement officials.17 If the other principles
animating insider trading doctrine are not compatible with property principles,
the tensions between these principles may be the cause of the ambiguity in the
law. Third, the existence of property principles in the law provides a clear path
forward for legal reform. Either lawmakers or courts can bring the doctrine into
greater harmony with long-standing property principles, or they can clearly
identify and prioritize the competing principles in the doctrine.
The discussion of the implications of the property principles animating the
doctrine in Part IV will hopefully act as a starting point for future scholarship
and policy analyses.
I. THE REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING
The first thing to note about the federal prohibition against insider trading is
that the name of the prohibition is misleading. Federal law prohibits much more
than trading by insiders. The anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933
and the Exchange Act of 1934 are both used to penalize employees, independent
contractors, and other agents of the company whose shares are being traded
(insiders), as well as the agents or fiduciaries of a source of information
unrelated to the company whose shares are being traded (outsiders). In addition,
Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act, which prohibits short-swing profits,
penalizes not only directors and officers (insiders), but also principal
stockholders (outsiders), without any proof that the stockholder’s ownership
position led to access to inside information.18 The second thing to note is that
17. See Kim, supra note 1, at 949 (“To counter serious doctrinal instability and to answer
persistent normative skepticism, we need a better theory of insider trading law.”); ANDERSON,
supra note 8, at 3 (Describing the “American insider trading enforcement regime [as] broken,”
Anderson argues that the uncertainty in the law “directly impacts shareholder value and leaves
market players at the mercy of prosecutorial caprice.”); see also Nagy, supra note 1; Strudler &
Orts, supra note 1; Macey, supra note 1; see also Preet Bharara & Robert J. Jackson Jr., Insider
Trading Laws Haven’t Kept Up With the Crooks, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/09/opinion/sec-insider-trading-united-states.html.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2012).
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the prohibition of insider trading is justified and expressed through several
statutory provisions and SEC rules.
A. Short-Swing Profits: Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act
The provision that looks most like an explicit attempt by Congress to regulate
insider trading is Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act.19 This provision aims to
prevent “the unfair use of information which may have been obtained” by a
company’s directors, officers and principal stockholders20 by prohibiting shortswing profits.21 Section 16(b) defines “short-swing profits” as any profits
generated by the purchase and sale or by the sale then purchase of securities, if
those corresponding trades happened in the span of less than six months.22
Section 16(b) allows a civil action to be brought for the disgorgement of any
short-swing profits earned by a company’s directors, officers, or principal
stockholders.23 The only parties recognized as having standing in a Section
16(b) civil action are the company that issued the traded shares or the
shareholders of that company.24 Whether or not the party bringing the suit is the
company itself or one of the shareholders, the disgorged profits are given to the
company. However, Section 16(b) does not authorize the SEC to bring
enforcement actions under the provision.25
B. Fraud: Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, Section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act, and Rule 10b-5
When scholars discuss the prohibition of insider trading, they are most often
discussing an application of the anti-fraud provisions of U.S. federal securities
law.26 io are the broad anti-fraud provisions generally used to support imposing
legal liability for insider trading. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act makes it:
unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities…(1) to
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or (2) to obtain
money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact
or any omission to state a material fact…or (3) to engage in any

19. Richard J. Morgan, Insider Trading and the Infringement of Property Rights, 48 OHIO ST.
L.J. 79, 82 (1987) (describing Section 16(b) as “Congress’ specific response to the problem of
insider trading”); see also ANDERSON, supra note 8, at 27 (describing Section 16(b) as “the only
provision of the Exchange Act that explicitly addresses insider trading”).
20. A principal stockholder is defined in Section 16(a) of the Exchange Act as “the beneficial
owner of more than 10 percent of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted security)
which is registered pursuant to section 12.” Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, INSIDER TRADING LAW AND POLICY 226 (2014).
26. Id. at 1–2.
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transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.27
SEC Rule 10b-5 makes it:
unlawful for any person…(a) [t]o employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud, (b) [t]o make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact…or (c) [t]o engage in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.28
Rule 10b-5 was authorized under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and was
modeled on Section 17(a) of the Securities Act.29 The important difference
between the two provisions is that the language of Section 17(a) of the Securities
Act limits liability to the context of an offer or sale and limits the harm
recognized to those involving “a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.”30 Rule
10b-5 covers fraud aimed at inducing either purchases or sales, and the rule
contains no language limiting liability to those who deceive or defraud a buyer
or seller.31 The broader application of Rule 10b-5 likely explains why it
dominates civil and criminal actions aimed at penalizing insider trading.32
However, it is important to remember that the prohibition also relies on
Securities Act 17(a). In addition to the SEC citing Section 17(a) of the Securities
Act in Cady, Roberts,33 the first modern insider trading case, the SEC also relied
on the provision in Dirks v. S.E.C. in 1983.34 Because neither Section 17(a) of
the Securities Act, nor Rule 10b-5, explicitly prohibit insider trading, two
theories have developed to justify the prohibition: the classical theory and the
misappropriation theory. In addition, courts have developed a doctrine to find
liability for tippers and tippees of material nonpublic information.
The Supreme Court gave the classical theory its final form in the case of
United States v. O’Hagan.35 The Court in O’Hagan describes the classical
theory as follows:
Under the “traditional” or “classical theory” of insider trading liability,
[Section] 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are violated when a corporate insider
trades in the securities of his corporation on the basis of material,
nonpublic information. Trading on such information qualifies as a
“deceptive device” under [Section] 10(b)…because “a relationship of
27. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2012).
28. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2012) (emphasis added).
31. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018).
32. Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94
IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1376–77 (2009).
33. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 908 (Nov. 9, 1961).
34. Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
35. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 642 (1997).
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trust and confidence [exists] between the shareholders of a corporation
and those insiders who have obtained confidential information by
reason of their position with that corporation.” That relationship, we
recognized, “gives rise to a duty to disclose [or to abstain from trading]
because of the ‘necessity of preventing a corporate insider
from…taking unfair advantage of…uninformed…stockholders.’”
The classical theory applies not only to officers, directors, and other
permanent insiders of a corporation, but also to attorneys, accountants,
consultants, and others who temporarily become fiduciaries of a
corporation.36
The Supreme Court first considered the misappropriation theory in
Chiarella,37 and gave the theory its stamp of approval in O’Hagan.38 The Court
in O’Hagan begins by explaining that the language of Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act does not limit liability to those who engage in the “deception of a
purchaser or seller,” but also reaches any deceptive device used “in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.”39 The Court then explains the
misappropriation theory as follows:
The “misappropriation theory” holds that a person commits fraud “in
connection with” a securities transaction, and thereby violates
[Section] 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, when he misappropriates confidential
information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed
to the source of the information….Under this theory, a fiduciary’s
undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal’s information to purchase
or sell securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality,
defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that information. In lieu
of premising liability on a fiduciary relationship between company
insider and purchaser or seller of the company’s stock, the
misappropriation theory premises liability on a fiduciary-turnedtrader’s deception of those who entrusted him with access to
confidential information.40
Note that under both the classical theory and the misappropriation theory,
disclosure is a defense against liability.41
Finally, the tipper and tippee doctrines that have developed as courts have
applied Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, Section (10)(b) of the Exchange Act,
and Rule 10b-5 to insider trading creates liability for those individuals not
obviously covered by the classical or misappropriation theories.42 When a
fiduciary covered under the classical or misappropriation theory (a tipper)
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 651–52 (internal citations omitted).
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 237 n.21 (1980).
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 650.
Id. at 651 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 652.
Id. at 651–52, 655.
Id. at 697–98.
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discloses information to someone not covered under either theory (a tippee),
liability will be imposed on the tipper and tippee, if the disclosure constitutes a
breach of duty. In Dirks v. S.E.C., the U.S. Supreme Court stated that to
determine if there has been a breach of duty “requires courts to focus on
objective criteria, i.e., whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal
benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit
that will translate into future earnings.”43 In addition to those circumstances in
which the tipper receives an explicit pecuniary gain, the Court declared that
“elements of [a breach of] fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic
information also exist when an insider makes a gift of confidential information
to a trading relative or friend.”44
C. Tender Offers and Nonpublic Information: Section 14(e) of the Exchange
Act and Rule 14e-3
Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act was added as a result of Congress passing
the Williams Act, which was aimed at regulating tender offers for publicly
traded securities.45 Section 14(e) authorizes the SEC to create “rules and
regulations [that] define [which] acts and practices [are] fraudulent, deceptive,
or manipulative.”46 As a result, the SEC created Rule 14e-3, which defines
anyone other than the offeror trading on nonpublic information about an
impending tender offer as a “fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or
practice within the meaning of section 14(e).”47 Rule 14e-3 also makes it
unlawful for tender offerors to “communicate material, nonpublic information
relating to a tender offer to any other person under circumstances in which it is
reasonably foreseeable that such communication is likely to result in” trading on
nonpublic information about an impending tender offer.48
D. Remedies for Private Plaintiffs: Section 20A of the Exchange Act
In 1988, Congress enacted Section 20A of the Exchange Act49 in response to
a circuit split over the question of whether a private plaintiff could recover when
another person violates the prohibition on insider trading.50 Because the federal

43. Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 663 (1983).
44. Id. at 664.
45. Jonathan G. Katz, SEC Interpretation: Commission Guidance on Mini-Tender Offers and
Limited Partnership Tender Offers, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Jul. 31, 2000),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/34-43069.htm.
46. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2012).
47. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2018).
48. Id.
49. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–704, 102
Stat 4677.
50. LARRY D. SODERQUIST & THERESA A. GABALDON, SECURITIES REGULATION 549–50
(Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 9th ed. 2018) (“Legislative history cited with approval the [Shapiro]
opinion discussed in Fridrich.”) (internal citations omitted).
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prohibition is most often justified under the anti-fraud provisions of securities
regulations, many courts held plaintiffs responsible for proving all of the
elements of fraud recognized in Rule 10b-5 civil actions before a plaintiff could
recover.51 These elements include reliance, which courts describe as providing
“the requisite causal connection between a defendant’s misrepresentation and a
plaintiff’s injury.”52 Some courts, as in the case of Fridrich v. Bradford,53
determined that in the context of trading over an impersonal exchange, it was
almost impossible to prove that the act of one party trading with material
nonpublic information could have been relied upon by a second party who had
no interaction with the first.
Although in line with the reasoning in pre-SEC state court decisions,54 the
court in Fridrich explicitly rejected the reasoning of the court in Shapiro v.
Merrill Lynch,55 which determined that “the Supreme Court eliminated proof of
reliance as a prerequisite to recovery in a 10b-5 case involving nondisclosure.”56
In response to this circuit split, Congress added Section 20A to the Exchange
Act, which—instead of proof of reliance—requires proof that a plaintiff traded
contemporaneously with and in opposition to a party engaged in insider
trading.57 A defendant’s liability to all potential plaintiffs is limited to the gross
profit realized or loss avoided by the violator.58 In addition, a defendant’s
potential liability to private plaintiffs is reduced by any amount already
disgorged by the SEC or the Department of Justice in a government enforcement
action.59 However, Section 20A of the Exchange Act does not prohibit or restrict
insider trading; it only creates standing for private parties who trade
contemporaneously with someone who trades in violation of some other
provision barring insider trading to recover from the violator.60
Now, compare Section 20A of the Exchange Act to Section 16(b) of the
Exchange Act. Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act only gives the issuer or
current shareholders standing to sue for a violation of the provision, and only
allows the issuer to recover the profits disgorged from officers, directors, or
principal stockholders.61 Section 20A of the Exchange Act is indifferent to a
plaintiff’s position as shareholder or non-shareholder both before and after the

51. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005).
52. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988).
53. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318–19 (6th Cir. 1976).
54. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (1933).
55. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1972),
aff’d, 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
56. Id. at 275 (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972)).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (2012).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–704, §
5, 102 Stat. 4677, 4680–81 (1988).
61. 15 U.S.C § 78p (2012).
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prohibited transaction.62 The salient factor is whether the plaintiff traded
contemporaneously with the defendant.63 Further, it is unlikely (though not
impossible) that an issuer will become a plaintiff in a Section 20A action, since
issuers seldom have less material nonpublic information when trading with
insiders.64 As a result, the parties with standing to sue and recover damages
under the only clear restriction on insider trading created by Congress, Section
16(b), are completely different than the parties able to sue and recover damages
under Section 20A.
II. THE ROLE OF PROPERTY IN THE REGULATION
What is the role of property in the prohibition of insider trading? In short, the
SEC and federal courts rely on property to justify imposing liability for insider
trading. As this Section will demonstrate, the SEC and federal courts (1) cite
statutes aimed at the protection of property rights and (2) identify the violation
of some party’s property rights in inside information when imposing liability for
insider trading. The most explicit reliance on property principles can be seen in
the application of the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act to prohibit insider trading. Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act
makes it unlawful to use material misrepresentations “to obtain money or
property…in the offer or sale of any securities,”65 and Exchange Act Rule 10b5 is modeled on Section 17(a) of the Securities Act. In applying these provisions
under the misappropriation theory, several courts explicitly call the information
in question the property of the source of the information. In applying these
provisions under the classical theory, the SEC in Cady, Roberts and several
courts in other cases claim that the information obtained by insiders was
information only intended for the benefit of the company. This invocation of
the exclusive use principle explicitly identifies the violation of the security
issuer’s property rights in confidential business information as a premise for
insider trading liability.
A more implicit reliance on property principles can be found in the effects of
eliminating the need for enforcement officials or civil plaintiffs to prove reliance
or intentional inducement in order to make defendants face liability. Because
the doctrine eliminates the need to show an interference with a plaintiff’s liberty
interest to impose liability, federal U.S. insider trading doctrine may place
greater reliance on the violation of some party’s property rights when compared
to common law fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent nondisclosure
doctrines.

62. § 5, 102 Stat. at 4680–81.
63. Id.
64. Id. As an exception to this expectation, consider that some of the defendants in Texas
Gulf Sulfur were officers who accepted stock options from the issuer without first disclosing the
ore find in Canada. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 856–57 (2d Cir. 1968).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2012).
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A. Reliance on Property-Based Statutes and Rules
When enforcement officials and federal courts cite the anti-fraud provisions
of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act as giving them the authority to
prohibit insider trading, they are explicitly invoking the property-protecting
functions written into those provisions. Although Section 17(a) of the Securities
Act was enacted in May 193366 and Rule 10b-5 was adopted in December
1948,67 the first enforcement action applying these provisions to insider trading,
In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,68 did not occur until 1961. As outlined in Section
I.A. above, Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act makes it unlawful to use
material misrepresentations “to obtain money or property” in the offer or sale of
any securities. Subsection (a)(2) is one of three subsections of Section 17(a) of
the Securities Act. In Cady, Roberts the SEC claimed that the three main
subdivisions of Section 17(a) are “mutually supporting rather than mutually
exclusive. Thus, a breach of duty of disclosure may be viewed as a device or
scheme, an implied misrepresentation, and an act or practice, violative of all
three subdivisions.”69 To draw this conclusion, the SEC followed the lead of the
Delaware district court in Speed v. Transamerica Corp., which made the same
claim about the interrelated nature of all three subsections of Exchange Act Rule
10b-5.70
Recall that Rule 10b-5 was modeled on Section 17(a) of the Securities Act.
Although Rule 10b-5 does not contain the term “property,” it is reasonable to
conclude that the concept is captured by the language restricting the application
of the rule to “the purchase or sale of any security,” because securities are a
species of property.71 Similar reasoning provides additional support for the
conclusion that liability under Section 17(a) of the Securities Act is limited to
cases that involve the violation of some party’s property rights, because that
provision is limited to cases involving the “offer or sale of any securities.”72
This explicit property language in the anti-fraud provisions of U.S. securities

66. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2012).
67. Rules and Regulations under Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 13 Fed. Reg. 8177, 8183
(Dec. 22, 1948).
68. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 907 (Nov. 9, 1961).
69. Id. at 913.
70. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951).
71. Rules and Regulations under Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 13 Fed. Reg. at 8183.
The Deleware Code explicity states, “[t]he shares of stock in every corporation shall be deemed
personal property.” Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 159 (West 2019). After describing an equity investor’s
share interests in a corporation as distinct from the property legally owned by the corporation itself
in every jurisdiction, Allen et al. describe each share as an investor’s “personal legal property.”
ALLEN, ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 99, (3rd
ed. 2009).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 77q. (2012).
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law is in harmony with the view of scholars who describe property as defining
“the entitlements people…can sue in tort in order to protect.”73
The next two subsections of this Article demonstrate how the case law based
on Section 17(a) and Rule 10b-5 continue to identify the violation of property
rights as a partial justification of legal liability.
B. Reliance on Property in Insider Trading Case Law
The misappropriation theory of liability comes later in the history of insider
trading jurisprudence. However, it is useful to consider misappropriation cases
first because they explicitly cite the violation of some party’s property rights in
breach of a fiduciary duty as the justification for legal liability. The Court in
O’Hagan explains that liability will be imposed under the misappropriation
theory when “a fiduciary’s undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal’s
information to purchase or sell securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty and
confidentiality, defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that information.”74
The Court elaborates that a “company’s confidential information qualifies as
property to which the company has a right of exclusive use; the undisclosed
misappropriation of such information constitutes fraud akin to embezzlement.”75
It is noteworthy that the Court views insider trading under the
misappropriation theory as analogous to embezzlement and not conversion. A
person can commit conversion against a stranger. However, the Court reminds
readers that embezzlement entails “the fraudulent appropriation to one’s own
use of the money or goods entrusted to one’s care by another.”76 Referencing
embezzlement and not conversion reminds us that even under the
misappropriation theory of liability concerns about the violation of property
rights are inextricably tied to concerns about fiduciary obligations.
The explicit role of property under the misappropriation theory of liability is
widely acknowledged by scholars.77 Less discussed is the connection that courts
make between property rights and fiduciary obligations in these cases.
However, recognizing that connection in misappropriation theory cases makes
it easier to recognize the reliance on property to justify the classical theory of
liability.78 After rejecting the equal access rational, the Court in Chiarella
explained that nondisclosure prior to securities trading is fraudulent only when
an insider trades in violation of “a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and

73. THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW:
PROPERTY 1 (2010).
74. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997).
75. Id. at 643.
76. Id. at 654 (quoting Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27 (1987)).
77. See Nagy, supra note 1, at 1265–66.
78. This is true despite the language quoted above coming from the portion of the Carpenter
opinion grappling with the application of the mail and wire fraud statutes, instead of those sections
dealing with the application of securities laws.
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confidence.”79 This declaration has led many scholars to conclude that the
classical theory of liability is either solely or fundamentally justified by a breach
of the fiduciary duty of loyalty. However, the next few paragraphs show how
concerns about a breach of the duty of loyalty in classical theory cases is always
linked to concerns about property rights.
The breach of fiduciary duty used to justify liability in classical theory cases
is derivative of some party’s property rights in confidential business
information. Beginning with the SEC’s administrative release on Cady, Roberts,
a long line of classical theory cases describe the nonpublic information involved
as only available for the use of the issuing company. In explaining the principles
that allow the prohibition of insider trading to extend beyond classical insiders,
the SEC states that the obligation rests in part on “the existence of a relationship
giving access . . . to information intended to be available only for a corporate
purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone.”80 Several federal courts
have repeated this test for liability, which identifies (1) making personal use of
(2) information received through certain kinds of relationships (3) when that
information was solely available for the benefit of the corporate entity. This test
was repeated by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Texas Gulf Sulfurs81 and
by the Supreme Court in Chiarella.82
Describing inside information as “available only for a corporate purpose and
not for the personal benefit of anyone” is similar to the language used by the
Court in Carpenter when it describes business information as “a species of
property to which the corporation has the exclusive right and benefit.”83 The
statement also resembles Merrill and Smith’s description of ownership as
identifying when someone “has the right to exclude others’ use of the thing and
. . . has the right to use the thing.”84 These similarities support the conclusion
that the SEC and federal courts recognize that liability for insider trading under
the classical theory is predicated in part on the violation of the issuing company’s
property rights.
The Supreme Court’s most recent statement of classical theory liability does
not explicitly mention a violation of exclusive use rights.85 This makes the role
79. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (“[O]ne who fails to disclose material
information prior to the consummation of a transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty
to do so. And the duty to disclose arises when one party has information ‘that the other [party] is
entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between
them.’” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976))).
80. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (Nov. 8, 1961) (emphasis added).
81. S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
82. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227 (internal citations omitted) (“The Commission emphasized that
the duty arose from (i) the existence of a relationship affording access to inside information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate
insider to take advantage of that information by trading without disclosure.”).
83. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987).
84. See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 76, at 4–5.
85. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 643 (1997).
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of property less obvious, but no less relevant. In O’Hagan, the Court explains
that liability is imposed under the classical theory “when a corporate insider
trades in his corporation’s securities on the basis of material, confidential
information he has obtained by reason of his position.”86 Consider that the
Supreme Court has stated that confidential business information “has long been
recognized as property.” This supports viewing the most recent statement of
classical theory liability as imposing liability when an insider (1) makes personal
use of (2) information meant for the sole benefit of the corporate entity (3) if the
information is received through certain kinds of relationships.
Further obscuring the reliance on a violation of the issuer’s property rights in
information, the Court in O’Hagan does not describe the insider’s duty to
disclose as arising out of a relationship between the insider and the company.
Instead, the Court states that the duty arises out of “a relationship of trust and
confidence between the corporation’s shareholders and the insider.”87 However,
as explained in Section II.C. below, it makes sense to view any fiduciary
obligations that insiders owe to shareholders as arising out of shareholders’
equitable title to the information in which the issuer holds legal title.88
C. Reliance on Property in Other Misrepresentation or Nondisclosure Cases
The role of property in common law fraudulent misrepresentation and
fraudulent nondisclosure cases provides an interesting point of comparison. In
many ways, both the statutes relied on for authority and the case law explaining
the prerequisites of liability for insider trading place a greater emphasis on
property rights than the common law doctrines of misrepresentation and
nondisclosure resulting in pecuniary loss. According to the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, in addition to remedying the interference with a person’s
rights to “money or property,”89 common law misrepresentation and
nondisclosure doctrines seem equally if not more focused on addressing an
interference with the liberty interests of the defrauded party. The concern for
liberty interests is shown by the fact that several of the elements in the legal tests
for liability under these doctrines are related to the defendant inducing the
plaintiff to take or avoid some action. Of the five elements required for
fraudulent misrepresentation described in the Restatement, three relate to the
actions or inactions of the plaintiff. Expectation of inducing conduct,90
justifiable reliance,91 and causation92 each limit the defendant’s liability to harm
caused by the plaintiff’s actions or inactions that were the result of or intended
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See infra notes 130–32 and accompanying text.
89. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), aff’d, 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 531 (AM. LAW. INST. 1977).
91. Id. § 537.
92. Id. § 546 cmt. a.

224

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 69.2:1

from the defendant’s misrepresentation. Showing a similar concern for liberty
interests, liability for nondisclosure is imposed under common law when a
person fails to disclose facts he knows “may justifiably induce the other to act
or refrain from acting in a business transaction.”93
Private actions brought under Rule 10b-5 follow the pattern of common law
misrepresentation and nondisclosure cases by requiring proof that the defendant
interfered with a plaintiff’s liberty interests.94 Outside of insider trading,
plaintiffs bringing a Rule 10b-5 claim most either prove reliance or a breach of
a duty to disclose in order to establish “the necessary nexus between the
plaintiffs’ injury and the defendant’s wrongful conduct.”95
Property only comes into play under the damages96 element of common law
fraudulent misrepresentation, and the role is limited compared to the anti-fraud
provisions of federal securities law. The Restatement describes damages as
generally measured based on (a) the difference in market value of (1) the object
received from the tortfeasor and (2) the consideration paid for the object, plus
(b) any other financial loss suffered because of relying on the
misrepresentation.97 We can assume that plaintiffs in these cases had property
rights in the consideration that they used in the transaction and some expectation
of the usefulness of the objects that they acquired in exchange for their
consideration. We can also think of the liberty interests identified in these
doctrines as liberty related to controlling the use and disposal of one’s property.
In addition to relying on a violation of a defrauded party’s property rights in
the transaction consideration, nondisclosure cases sometimes impose liability
based on a violation of the defrauded person’s equitable ownership rights in
property to which the defendant held legal title before the transaction.98 Under
common law, nondisclosure is viewed as analogous to an affirmative
misrepresentation only in exceptional cases, including when the nondisclosing
party has information that “the other is entitled to know because of a fiduciary
or other similar relation of trust and confidence between them.”99 An example
of such a case is the failure of a trustee to disclose all material information before
transacting with a trust beneficiary in trust assets. Many cite the trust
beneficiary’s equitable title to trust assets as a justification for the fiduciary’s
93. Id. § 551 (emphasis added).
94. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988).
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551.
96. Id. § 549 cmt. 1.
97. Id. § 549.
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §170 (AM. LAW. INST. 1959) (“The trustee in
dealing with the beneficiary on the trustee’s own account is under a duty to the beneficiary to deal
fairly with him and to communicate to him all material facts in connection with the transaction
which the trustee knows or should know.”); see also id. § 2 (“A trust, as the term is used in [this]
Restatement…is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, subjecting the person by whom
the title to the property is held to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of another
person, which arises as a result of a manifestation of an intention to create it.”).
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (AM. LAW. INST. 1977).
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duty to disclose all material information related to a conflicted transaction.100
Because some treatises describe these disclosure obligations as required to
ensure a “fair” transaction, it suggests that some legal doctrines rely on property
or consent-based notions of fairness.101
It is worth noting that the damages element in common law fraudulent
misrepresentation and fraudulent nondisclosure doctrines does not exclusively
rely on the violation of property rights. In addition, losses related to rights
arising out of contractual agreements are also recoverable under these doctrines.
Plaintiffs defrauded in a business transaction are “also entitled to recover
additional damages sufficient to give him the benefit of his contract with the
maker, if these damages are proved with reasonable certainty.”102 Separately, in
addition to liability resulting from a breach of fiduciary duty, one can face
liability for nondisclosure under common law in exceptional cases that involve
no violation of equitable ownership rights. For example, one can face liability
for nondisclosure if there are “matters known to him that he knows to be
necessary to prevent his partial or ambiguous statement of the facts from being
misleading,” or he “subsequently [acquires] information that he knows will
make untrue or misleading a previous representation that when made was true
or believed to be [true].”103
Therefore, few elements under common law fraudulent misrepresentation or
fraudulent nondisclosure rely on the violation of some party’s property rights to
justify imposing liability, and these elements do not rely exclusively on the
violation of property rights.
By comparison, because Section 20A of the Exchange Act effectively
eliminates the need to prove an interference with a party’s liberty interests,
insider trading cases brought by civilians implicitly place a greater emphasis on
the violation of some party’s property rights to justify imposing liability. Most
agree that liability under the misappropriation theory is premised on the
defendant violating the property rights of the source of the information.104 In
addition, the statement of what justifies imposing legal liability under the
classical theory of insider trading describes liability as premised on the violation
of the issuer’s property rights in information.105 The element of the test for
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (AM. LAW. INST. 1959); see also MERRILL &
SMITH, supra note 76, at 153–157.
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (AM. LAW. INST. 1959) (“The trustee in
dealing with the beneficiary on the trustee’s own account is under a duty to the beneficiary to deal
fairly with him and to communicate to him all material facts in connection with the transaction
which the trustee knows or should know.”); see also id. § 216 (“The consent of the beneficiary does
not preclude him from holding the trustee liable for a breach of trust, if…the beneficiary, when he
gave his consent, did not know of his rights and of the material facts which the trustee knew or
should have known and which the trustee did not reasonably believe that the beneficiary knew.”).
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549 (AM. LAW. INST. 1977).
103. Id. § 551.
104. Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 1606.
105. See supra Section II.C.
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insider trading liability that is based on a violation of the issuer’s property rights
in information is in addition to and separate from any property interests that
parties trading without inside information have in their transaction
consideration. This aspect of the prohibition is analogous to common law trust
cases in which defendants face liability for a breach of a fiduciary duty to
disclose.106 But the analogy ends there in insider trading cases.
Cases brought under the classical and misappropriation theories of insider
trading seem to disregard the information owner’s liberty interests. Because it
is not the source of the information who trades with the defendant in a
misappropriation case, the deception in question does not induce any action or
inaction on the part of the legal and equitable owner of the information.
Moreover, defendants in misappropriation theory cases can avoid insider trading
liability for using the source’s information without consent. In explaining that
deception is an essential element of the misappropriation theory, the Court in
O’Hagan reiterated that “[t]o satisfy the common law rule that a trustee may not
use the property that [has] been entrusted [to] him, there would have to be
consent. To satisfy the requirement of the Securities Act that there be no
deception, there would only have to be disclosure.”107 In addition, consider that
issuers in classical theory cases are subject to the same obligation to disclose
material nonpublic information or abstain from trading under Rule 10b-5.108 If
issuers are not permitted to trade on the information themselves, we cannot
expect them to be able to lawfully consent to their employees or other agents
trading on the information. Both classical and misappropriation theory cases
minimize the role of consent. Therefore, both theories places less reliance on the
interference with a liberty interest than common law fraud or other Rule 10b-5
cases.
The elimination of the need to prove a violation of some party’s liberty
interests to impose liability for insider trading suggests an increased reliance on
the violation of property rights to justify these doctrines.109
D. Summary
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that misappropriation theory cases are
not the only cases in which liability for insider trading is premised on the
violation of some party’s property rights. The duty to disclose or abstain from
106. It is unclear whether enforcement officials or federal courts are relying on a violation of
the issuer’s legal title or a transacting shareholder’s equitable title to the information in order to
impose liability.
107. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654 (1997) (internal citations omitted).
108. See McCormick v. Fund Am. Companies, Inc., 26 F.3d 869, 876 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal
citations omitted) (“Numerous authorities have held or otherwise stated that the corporate issuer in
possession of material nonpublic information, must, like other insiders in the same situation,
disclose that information to its shareholders or refrain from trading with them.”).
109. Alternatively, the reduced reliance on the violation of liberty interests may be the result
of an increased reliance on some new animating principle in the doctrine.
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trading in classical theory cases is derivative of the legal or equitable ownership
rights that stock issuers and their shareholders have in confidential business
information. Beginning with the SEC in Cady, Roberts and continuing with the
Supreme Court in Chiarella (and beyond), an insider making personal use of
information intended for the sole benefit of the company is the breach of
fiduciary duty that justifies liability in classical theory cases. The connection
between the fiduciary duties in classical theory cases and property rights
becomes more obvious when we recognize that the violation of property rights
in misappropriation theory cases is always tied to breaches of duty arising out of
fiduciary or similar relationships of trust and confidence.
In addition, the SEC and federal courts rely on Section 17(a) of the Securities
Act and Rule 10b-5, which aim to protect investors’ property rights in their
securities, money, and other transaction consideration. Finally, unlike other
fraudulent deception cases, insider trading doctrine almost eliminates the need
to prove an interference with the plaintiff’s liberty interests. As a result, the
prohibition may place a greater reliance on the violation of some party’s property
rights to justify imposing liability.
Of course, the preceding analysis does not support the conclusion that U.S.
insider trading doctrine can be fully explained by a property rationale. However,
the evidence does support accepting the conclusion that property principles
always play a role in the regulation of insider trading. With the continuous and
undeniable reliance on property principles to justify liability under both the
classical and misappropriation theories of insider trading, one should ask why
so many scholars have missed the fact that the SEC and courts rely on property,
in part, to justify the prohibition under the classical theory. The next Section
explores one explanation: many scholars treat property principles as either
unimportant or nonexistent in an area of law that clearly embodies some other
doctrine.
III. MISSING THE ROLE OF PROPERTY IN THE REGULATION
Many legal scholars view insider trading law as either devoid of or only
occasionally motivated by property principles.110 Some have described this area
of law as a form of federal securities fraud doctrine, or common law fraud and
fiduciary duties doctrine—not property doctrine.111 For these scholars, the

110. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 1591; Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 314; Karmel,
supra note 6, at 168.
111. See Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 1591 (“The insider trading prohibition ought to be viewed
as a means of protecting property rights in information, rather than as a means of preventing
securities fraud….Unfortunately, the SEC’s regulatory jurisdiction over insider trading meant that
the problem was treated as a species of securities fraud rather than one of property rights.”); see
also Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 314 (“Whenever the question of property rights in information
arises, the legislature or the court must confront the tensions between principles that encourage the
creation of new information and those that allow the existing stock of information to be well used.
If the Court puts information cases in securities law or evidence law pigeonholes, it may overlook
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driving force behind federal securities regulation is the mandatory disclosure
requirements aimed at investor protection, which they describe as being at odds
with protecting property rights in information.112 Many only view the
misappropriation theory of liability as justified by the goal of protecting property
rights and treat the classical theory of liability as devoid of property
justifications.113
The debate among securities regulation scholars over whether property
principles best explain the current insider trading regime is analogous to a debate
that intellectual property scholars are having about trade secret law.114 Many of
these scholars seem to take an underinclusive approach to identifying distinct
doctrinal principles in one area of law. Its seems as if many securities regulation
scholars are looking for the one legal doctrine that explains all insider trading
cases.115 Yet there are bodies of law containing property principles while
simultaneously containing tort116 or contract117 principles. It is therefore
possible for federal securities regulations to simultaneously contain multiple
doctrines. This Section highlights a few examples of the underinclusive
approach to identifying property principles in insider trading scholarship. It then
identifies examples of property doctrine operating concurrently with other legal
doctrines.

the need to consider the way in which the incentive to produce information and the demands of
current use conflict.”); see also Karmel, supra note 6, at 168 (Karmel, a former Securities and
Exchange Commissioner, described the “view that inside information is a property right that
insiders should be permitted to exploit [as] morally obnoxious and legally unsound.”).
112. Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 1608 (“The basic function of a securities fraud regime is to
ensure timely disclosure of accurate information to investors.”); see also id. at 1649 (“If we want
to protect investors from informational disadvantages that cannot be overcome by research or
skill…[then] the equal access test is far better suited to doing so than the Chiarella/Dirks [property
rights] framework.”); see Karmel, supra note 6, at 168–173 (Karmel concluded that the property
and other private law rationales for the insider trading prohibition were “simply inadequate to cover
the fact patterns of cases in which some have been enjoined by the SEC or have even gone to
prison.” She argued that a better doctrinal fit would come from an increased understanding of the
prohibition as protecting investors by supplementing the “mandatory continuous disclosure
system” in U.S. securities law).
113. See Kim, supra note 1, at 947, 974–986.
114. Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification,
86 CALIF. L. REV. 241, 244 (1998). (“The relational focus of trade secret’s liability rules aligns
trade secret law more closely with the law of contract than with the law of property.”); Mark A.
Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 313
(2008) (Arguing “that trade secrets can be justified as a form, not of traditional property, but of
intellectual property (IP).”); Eric R. Claeys, Private Law Theory and Corrective Justice in Trade
Secrecy, 4 J. TORT L. [ii], 63 (2011) (Arguing “that the proprietary account of trade secrecy explains
the most features of trade secrecy.”).
115. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
116. See Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 22. Consider that trespass and conversion are viewed as
both tort and property doctrine.
117. Id. at 36. Consider that lease and license frameworks are viewed as embodying both
property and contract principles.
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A. Property Or . . .
One of the first articles to address the property implications of the prohibition
on insider trading was a response to Henry Manne’s seminal Insider Trading
and the Stock Market.118 Manne opposed the prohibition on insider trading on
economic grounds. In a review of Manne’s book, Richard W. Jennings argued
that the prohibition was justified as a means of protecting the property rights of
shareholders, who he described as the ultimate owners of the information.119
Manne countered that Jennings’ argument was a red herring and rejected the
concept of “property” as useful for resolving any policy dispute.120 Manne
declared that “the concept of property is no more nor less than the rights and
obligations recognized by law,” and that the real issue is determining how the
law should develop based on objective methods of analysis.121
Scholars using economic analysis eventually combined Manne’s call for
objective analysis with a focus on property doctrine. In the early 1980s, scholars
such as Frank Easterbrook and Jonathan Macey began to explore whether a
property-based approach to the regulation of insider trading (as opposed to,
respectively, securities fraud and fairness approaches) would increase or
decrease efficiency in securities markets.122 In 1981, Easterbrook claimed that
the Supreme Court was treating insider trading cases as securities cases, thereby
putting “them in pigeonholes having little to do with information.”123 By
contrast, Easterbrook assumed that in information cases “the central question
was whether the principal had a property interest sufficient to require the agent
neither to use nor to disclose without the principal’s consent.”124 In 1984, Macey
attempted to encourage what he described as the U.S. Supreme Court’s “new
understanding of the fact that privileged corporate information is a valuable asset
in the nature of a property interest.”125 Macey described this as a new
understanding because he considered the pre-Chiarella interpretation of Rule
10b-5 as intended to maximize fairness among trading parties and as (at best)
indifferent to the protection of property or contract rights.126
Many of the scholars who followed Macey and Easterbrook continued to draw
sharp distinctions viewing insider trading as a form of property doctrine and
some other doctrine. For example, in 1987 Richard J. Morgan offered what he
described as “a proposed property rights approach to the analysis of insider
trading restrictions,” which he argued would resolve many of the analytical
118.
119.
120.
(1970).
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
See Jennings, supra note 1, at 1234.
Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547, 550
Id. at 550.
See Easterbrook, supra note 1; Macey, supra note 1.
See Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 312.
See id.
See Macey, supra note 1, at 11.
MACEY, supra note 8, at 50–58; see also Macey, supra note 1, at 10–11.
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problems inherent in the doctrine at that time.127 Morgan concluded that the
Supreme Court’s focus on “common law fraud [and] fiduciary
duties…contributed to the continuing uncertainty concerning the justification
and the application of the insider trading rules.”128 Later, Roberta S. Karmel, a
former commissioner of the SEC, described the “view that inside information is
a property right that insiders should be permitted to exploit [as] morally
obnoxious and legally unsound.”129 Karmel concluded that, as a doctrinal
matter, property and other private law limitations on the prohibition articulated
by the Supreme Court were “simply inadequate to cover the fact patterns of cases
in which some have been enjoined by the SEC or have even gone to prison.”130
She argued that a better doctrinal fit would come from an increased
understanding of the prohibition as protecting investors by supplementing the
“mandatory continuous disclosure system” in U.S. securities law.131
Karmel’s conclusion that a property rationale does a poor job of explaining
past decisions has been echoed in recent scholarship. In Insider Trading as
Private Corruption, Sung Hui Kim concludes that although a property rationale
may offer a “compelling normative approach to insider trading, [the rationale]
lacks sufficient descriptive power.”132 She argues that current insider trading
doctrine is missing two central features of American property doctrine—
exclusion and alienability. As a result, she concludes that a property rationale
not only does a poor job of describing past cases, but also has almost no “chance
at real-world relevance for judges and regulators grappling with hard cases.”133
The prior scholarship grappling with the role of property in insider trading
cases seems to take for granted that the current law is devoid of property
principles in some important way. It then proceeds to argue about how or why
lawmakers, regulators, and courts should or should not regulate insider trading
using property principles in the future. An example of this implicit assumption
is Stephen M. Bainbridge’s article Insider Trader Regulation: The Path
Dependent Choice between Property Rights and Securities Fraud.134 In that
article, Bainbridge states that:
The insider trading prohibition ought to be viewed as a means of
protecting property rights in information, rather than as a means of
preventing securities fraud. Viewed from that perspective, the preO’Hagan misappropriation theory correctly imposed liability on those
who converted information that belonged to another for their own
personal profit. Unfortunately, the SEC’s regulatory jurisdiction over
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Morgan, supra note 14, at 81.
Id. at 90.
See Karmel, supra note 6, at 168.
Id. at 173.
Id. at 169.
See Kim, supra note 1, at 977.
Id. at 986.
See Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 1589.
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insider trading meant that the problem was treated as a species of
securities fraud rather than one of property rights. [A] property rightsbased understanding of the prohibition…would premise liability on
theft, not deception. Because the text of Section 10(b), or Rule 10b5, clearly addresses deceit, not conversion of intellectual property, the
strict textualist approach to statutory interpretation mandated by
Central Bank proscribes such an understanding.135
According to Bainbridge, treating insider trading as a species of securities
fraud means that disclosure is the primary tool used to protect investors—not the
recognition and protection of property rights.136 He goes so far as to describe
the protection of investors as being at odds with the protection of property
rights.137 His view of a necessary split between securities fraud and property
protection is similar to the separation perceived by Morgan, Karmel,
Easterbrook and Macey. Morgan offered his property proposal as a cure to a
perceived overreliance on common law fraud and fiduciary duty concepts.
Karmel treats a property approach as necessarily in conflict with a regime
committed to using disclosure requirements in order to protect investors.
Easterbrook wanted to use a property rationale as an alternative to a securities
fraud rationale and, like Macey, argued that the “fairness arguments get us
nowhere.”138
What makes these perceived dichotomies strange is that securities fraud
doctrines are always property doctrines. As explained in Part II.C. above,
fiduciary duties of disclosure are generally aimed at the protection of a
beneficiary’s property interests. This fact makes sense considering that many
fiduciary relationships cannot be created without the existence of property being
held in trust.139 In addition, there are many areas in American law in which
fairness is defined as the protection of property or other private rights.
Moreover, many tort and criminal doctrines, such as trespass and conversion,
are specifically property tort and property crime doctrines. These property-and
doctrines can be understood in contrast to doctrines based exclusively on liberty
interests, such as battery or false imprisonment. Property-and doctrines can also
be understood by differentiating them from exclusively public law doctrines,
such as those prohibiting the capture of endangered species.
135. Id. at 1591, 1618.
136. Id. at 1608 (“The basic function of a securities fraud regime is to ensure timely disclosure
of accurate information to investors.”).
137. See id. at 1606 (“There is a growing consensus that the federal insider trading prohibition
is more easily justified as a means of protecting property rights in information than as a way of
protecting investors.”); see also id. at 1649 (“If we want to protect investors from informational
disadvantages that cannot be overcome by research or skill…[then] the equal access test is far better
suited to doing so than the Chiarella/Dirks [property rights] framework.”).
138. See Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 330; see also Macey, supra note 1, at 10 (Concluding
that the fairness “justifications were vague and ill formed and did not provide a coherent basis for
imposing legal sanctions.”).
139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 66 (AM. LAW INST. 1959).
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B. Property And . . .
As explained in Part II.D, liability for common law fraudulent
misrepresentation or fraudulent nondisclosure almost always requires the
interference with both a plaintiff’s liberty and property interests for liability to
be imposed.140 The duty to disclose or abstain from trading in insider trading
cases is analogous to the fiduciary duty of a trustee to disclose all material
information to a trust beneficiary before transacting in trust assets for the benefit
of the trustee.141 The law recognizes this duty as arising from the trust
beneficiary’s equitable title to trust assets being superior to the trustee’s legal
title to trust assets.142
In the context of publicly traded companies, it is not unreasonable to view the
issuer as analogous to a trustee, the shareholder as analogous to a trust
beneficiary, and insiders as analogous to agents of the trustee. Under this
framework, insiders might acquire the issuer’s duty of disclosure to shareholders
because they have agreed to manage corporate assets for the benefit of the
corporation, and the corporation has a duty to generate profits for the sole benefit
of shareholders as a whole. Therefore, the disclose or abstain rule has the
potential to operate as a form of protection of each shareholder’s equitable title
in the value of inside information, which would eliminate any conflict between
disclosure rules and rules that protect property rights in information.
Finally, defining fairness as the protection of some party’s property rights is
a common aspect of American law, especially in the area of trade secrets.143 As
a form of unfair competition, the Restatements identify the “appropriation of
intangible trade values including trade secrets.”144 In applying Texas’ trade
secret law, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals described the principle in the
following manner:
That the cost of devising the secret and the value the secret provides
are criteria in the legal formulation of a trade secret shows the
equitable underpinnings of this area of the law. It seems only fair that
one should be able to keep and enjoy the fruits of his labor. If a
businessman has worked hard, has used his imagination, and has taken
bold steps to gain an advantage over his competitors, he should be able
to profit from his efforts. Because a commercial advantage can vanish
once the competition learns of it, the law should protect the
businessman’s efforts to keep his achievements secret. As is discussed
140. See infra Section II.D.
141. See Oliver v. Oliver, 45 S.E. 232, 233–34 (Ga. 1903) (describing a director as “a quasi
trustee as to the shareholder’s interest in the shares”).
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 2, 74, and 170 (AM. LAW INST. 1959).
143. While some scholars dispute whether the area of trade secrets is properly conceived of as
property, tort, or some other doctrine, other scholars view this distinction as false. Further, as
discussed, infra in Section II.B., the U.S. Supreme Court emphatically endorsed the recognition of
confidential business information as a form of property in Carpenter v. United States.
144. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1995).
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below, this is an area of law in which simple fairness still plays a large
role.145
Despite the fact that liability for insider trading is premised on the misuse of
confidential business information, it has gone almost unacknowledged that the
conception of fairness used to impose liability in insider trading cases is almost
completely at odds with the conception of fairness used in trade secret cases.146
The version of fairness embodied in trade secret and other unfair competition
doctrines can be thought of as the “sweat equity” or the “property-based”
conception of fairness (property-based fairness).147
The foregoing analysis does not support the claim that U.S. insider trading
doctrine is a property doctrine, or that a property rationale is sufficient for
explaining past cases or deciding future cases. However, the analysis does
support the conclusion that it would be a mistake to treat certain non-property
doctrines as completely unrelated to property doctrine. Although the U.S.
insider trading regime does not strictly or consistently rely on common law
fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent nondisclosure, or trust principles when
imposing liability, the fact that these doctrines can and often do rely on property
principles demonstrates that treating fraud, fiduciary duty, fairness, or disclosure
doctrines as mutually exclusive from property doctrine is a mistake.
Of course, simply knowing that property principles have consistently
animated insider trading law is not that useful. Therefore, the next Section
explores a few of the implications of this fact.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE ANALYSIS OF THE REGULATION
Using the defendant’s violation of some party’s property rights in information
as a justification to impose legal liability has implications for the appropriate
scope and limits of insider trading doctrine. To the extent that the protection of
property rights cannot explain the scope of the law, then either something has
gone wrong or there are other valid principles animating this area of law. If
something has gone wrong, then some or all of the current insider trading regime
may be illegitimate. If other valid principles are animating this area of law, then
what are they? Both alternatives have implications for insider trading reform.
This Section explores these issues.

145. Metallurgical Indus. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1201 (5th Cir. 1986).
146. See Albert D. Spalding, Insider Tradings: Is there a Better Way? A proposed “Trade
Secrets” Approach, 11 MIDWEST L. REV. 140 (1993).
147. See Sweat Equity, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS (BARRON’S
BUSINESS GUIDES) (9th ed. 2014) (Equity created in a property by the hard work of the owner. For
example, a small business may be built up more on the efforts of its founders than on the capital
raised to finance it).

234

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 69.2:1

A. Illegitimacy and Insider Trading
If there are no other principles animating this area of law, then the failure of
the current insider trading regime to adhere to property principles should raise
concerns about legality. One question is whether the current regime meets the
standards of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The APA requires courts
to hold an agency action unlawful if it is found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”148 Further,
although economic regulations generally receive deference when constitutional
challenges are brought, that deference might be undermined if the justifications
presented by enforcement officials appear to be pretextual.149 The Supreme
Court will not always revisit the reasonableness of enforcement actions and
statutory interpretations once approved.150 However, an exception may be
warranted by the anomalous character of a regime that is justified by reference
to statutes and rules aimed at the protection of property rights and that premises
liability on the violation of property rights, while simultaneously restricting the
exercise of those rights. Unless the APA creates a statute of limitations on
reviewing agency actions, the disconnect between the current insider trading
regime and property principles may warrant determining whether imposing
liability for the practice fails to accord with the law.
If the ban on insider trading is motivated by a government policy objective
that conflicts with the protection of property rights, then justifying liability based
on the goal of protecting property rights becomes problematic. Recall that there
are myriad ways in which the current enforcement of the law and related statutes
undermine the protection of property and other private rights. Scholars like
Nagy,151 Karmel,152 and Kim153 have highlighted several departures from the
expected elements of a property regime. These departures from the expected
elements of a property regime may be the result of valid complementary
principles animating the law.154 However, they may also be the result of agency
reasoning that was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. The
disconnect is substantial enough to warrant an investigation.

148. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
149. Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S.Ct. 2551, 2573–74 (2019) (The Supreme Court
upheld the inclusion of a citizenship question in the 2020 census because the plaintiffs were able
demonstrate “that the Government had submitted an incomplete administrative record and that the
existing evidence supported a prima facie showing that the VRA rationale was pretextual.”).
150. See Stare Decisis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (The doctrine of
precedent, under which a court must follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise
again in litigation).
151. Nagy, supra note 43, at 1336–64 (discussing how federal courts and enforcement officials
have cast aside fiduciary principles, implying casting aside related property principles).
152. See Karmel, supra note 6, at 152.
153. See Kim, supra note 1, at 979–86 (highlighting the absences of alienability in insider
trading doctrine).
154. See supra Section III.B.
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An alternative concern is that lawmakers and courts have unintentionally
constructed a convoluted and unworkable regime in the area of insider trading.
John P. Anderson has argued that the current doctrine is vague, irrational, and
incoherent to the point of being unjust.155 If he is correct, then the current regime
might fail the constitutional test by lacking a rational basis or for being too
vague. These concerns may seem irrelevant since laws that restrict property
rights (e.g., zoning laws) have been accepted by courts as plausibly aimed at
serving some property protecting functions.156 Further, laws are only
infrequently deemed void for vagueness and that doctrine is generally only
applied to statues, not judge-made law.157 However, because the Supreme Court
has shown decreasing levels of deference to flexible interpretations of the law
over the last several decades, there may be enough of a shift in approach in the
near future to undercut the continued viability of the insider trading regime.
The first constitutional concern is related to two statutory changes that
Congress made in the 1980s. With Section 20A of the Exchange Act, Congress
authorized standing to bring private suits for those who trade contemporaneously
and in the opposite direction of defendants in insider trading cases.158 Congress
also amended Section 20A of the Exchange Act to increase the controlling
person liability faced by the employers of defendants in insider trading cases.159
Because of the amendments to Section 20(a), issuers in classical theory cases
and sources of information in misappropriation cases face liability for three
times the profits generated or losses avoided by the defendants in these cases.160
If a constitutional challenge is brought, courts may conclude that both provisions
fail to meet the flexible limits of the rational basis test.
Section 20A of the Exchange Act is constitutionally suspect because it gives
standing to someone other than the information owner to bring a private suit for
violating a prohibition that is premised on the violation of the owner’s property
rights in information. If there are no other principles animating this area of law,
then allowing those who trade contemporaneously to have standing to sue is
bizarre. In misappropriation theory cases the source of the information is both
the legal and equitable owner of the information. Therefore, it makes no sense
for a violation of the source’s property rights in information to authorize an
unrelated third party to sue the defendants in these cases. In classical theory
155. ANDERSON, supra note 8, at 5.
156. Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) (“There is no serious
difference of opinion in respect of the validity of laws and regulations fixing the height of buildings
within reasonable limits, the character of materials and methods of construction, and the adjoining
area which must be left open, in order to minimize the danger of fire or collapse, the evils of
overcrowding and the like, and excluding from residential sections offensive trades, industries and
structures likely to create nuisances.”).
157. See Ryan McCarl, Incoherent and Indefensible: An Interdisciplinary Critque of the
Supreme Court’s “Void -For-Vagueness” Doctrine, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 73, 91 (2014).
158. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(a) (2012).
159. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a)(3) (2012).
160. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a)(2) (2012).
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cases, parties with and without any ownership interest in the information have
standing to sue. Section 20A of the Exchange Act gives standing to
counterparties who were shareholders before the prohibited trades, which
implies that standing is justified by the shareholders’ equitable title to inside
information. However, Section 20A also gives standing to counterparties who
were not shareholders before the transaction. This standing framework is a
continuation of SEC and court decisions that recognized non-shareholders as
being injured by insiders who sell their shares without first disclosing material
nonpublic information.161 This framework, however, conflicts with a regime
premised on the violation of some party’s property rights in information.
Scholars such as Macey and Anderson have argued that using Section 20(a)
to impose controlling person liability on the information owners in insider
trading cases is irrational.162 The case law is replete with references to
information in classical theory cases being “available only for a corporate
purpose.”163 In addition, recall that the Court in O’Hagan argued that insider
trading in misappropriation theory cases is akin to the defendant embezzling the
property of the source of the information.164 Yet Congress has authorized the
corporate issuer in classical theory cases and the source of the information in
misappropriation theory cases to face legal penalties if it can be shown that they
did not take sufficient steps to prevent the violation of their property rights. The
same violation of property rights cited to justify imposing liability for insider
trading on the agents of the information owners. If insider trading is analogous
to embezzlement, then the use of Section 20(a) in these cases is analogous to
punishing the victims of embezzlement for being robbed by their agents.
It is difficult to imagine a rational basis for punishing the victims in cases of
theft or fraud. It may be tempting to explain this approach by claiming that by
failing to prevent insider trading, the owners of the information are vicariously
liable for the third-party harm caused by their agents’ illegal trading. However,
recall the problems with Section 20A of the Exchange Act noted in this Section
and the issues raised in the circuit split that inspired Section 20A of the Exchange
Act.165 If insiders are unable to influence the counter parties to their transactions
to participate, then insider trading does not embodying the reliance and causation
elements required to prove fraudulent nondisclosure in other cases.166 Therefore,
it seems mistaken to view insider trading resulting in the infringement of the
property or liberty interests of any market participant other than the information
owners—who now face legal penalties under Section 20A of the Exchange Act
if they do not do enough to prevent their agents from stealing their information.

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911–13 (Nov. 8, 1961).
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
See supra Section II.B.
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654 (1997).
See supra Section I.D.
See supra Section II.C.

2020]

Missing the Role of Property in Insider Trading Regulation

237

A second question is whether the interpretations of the anti-fraud statues and
rules used to prohibit insider trading can continue to be described as reasonable.
This concern is related to the question of constitutionality but is more precisely
a matter of statutory interpretation. In Chiarella, the Supreme Court argues that
it is “not a novel twist of the law” that insiders in possession of material
nonpublic information are required to disclose that information or abstain from
trading.167 In O’Hagan, the Court described the misappropriation theory of
liability as punishing behavior that constitutes common law fraudulent deception
“akin to embezzlement.”168 These determinations were made with Section 17(a)
of the Securities Act and Rule 10b-5 in mind. Recall that Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 are explicitly aimed at protecting
the property and liberty interests of market participants. Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act specifically outlaws the use of misrepresentations “to obtain
money or property” of investors through “the offer or sale of any securities.”169
The question remains: how can courts continue to describe a regime that restricts
so many incidents of ownership as plausibly aimed at preventing or remedying
fraudulent deception or nondisclosure?
Holding property owners liable for using their own property or for allowing
third parties to use their property is more analogous to an inalienability rule or a
vice law than a property rule.170 Insider trading doctrine both prohibits certain
information owners from using their information for securities trading and bars
these owners from licensing third parties to do the same. These restrictions
contradict the common and long-standing expectation that property owners have
a right to partially alienate their property for consideration.171 Consider that the
restrictions on the owners’ use of their own inside information found in Rule
14e-3 was deemed acceptable by the Court in part because Congress authorized
the SEC to define new behaviors as fraudulent in the context of regulating tender
offers.172 Rule 10b-5 and Section 17(a) do not make similar delegations of
lawmaking authority, so it is problematic that a doctrine based on statutes aimed

167. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980).
168. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 654.
169. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2012).
170. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 13, at 1111–12; ; also see Devlin, supra note 13,
at 3.
171. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 489 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1944) (“Property
interests are, in general, alienable. If a particular property interest is not alienable, this result must
be due to some policy against the alienability of such an interest.”); see Kim, supra note 1, at 979–
986 (highlighting the absences of alienability in insider trading doctrine); see DEL. CODE ANN. Tit.
8, §122(4) (empowering corporations to “sell…or otherwise dispose of…all or any of its property
and assets, or any interest therein.”); see MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 3.02(e) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2016) (authorizing corporations to “to sell…and otherwise dispose of all or any part of its
property”).
172. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 667 (Section 14(e) prohibits “fraudulent…acts…in connection with
any tender offer,” and authorizes the SEC to “define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to
prevent, such acts.”).
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at protecting property and other private rights would break from the common
elements of property regimes in so many ways.173
However problematic the Courts interpretive decisions in Chiarella and
O’Hagan may seem in hindsight, there are canons of statutory interpretation that
would support maintaining the status quo. Many would argue that stare decisis
warrants accepting these prior interpretations and deferring to Congress to make
any changes that would contradict the expectations that have developed around
these decisions. Consider, for example, the passage of the Insider Trading
Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA) and the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA). Some argue that the reenactment doctrine
requires treating the passage of ITSA and ITSFEA as congressional
authorization of the insider trading doctrine previously developed in the
courts.174
There is good reason, however, to doubt that adhering to either stare decisis
or the reenactment doctrine would weigh in favor of deference in the context of
insider trading law. To the extent that both canons are aimed at fostering rule of
law principles such as stability and notice, the popular view that insider trading
doctrine is incoherent and confusing may make both canons of interpretation
inapplicable to this area of law. For decades, scholars have lamented the
incoherence of insider trading law.175 Recall that Anderson has recently
described the doctrine as vague and incoherent to the point of being unjust.176
Even some prominent enforcement officials have recently described the law as
so confusing that it leaves investors uncertain “about what sorts of informationsharing or other activities by investors would be considered insider trading.”177
The popularity of describing insider trading law as unclear is surprising
considering that the complaints come from scholars who disagree about whether
insider trading should be prohibited178 and from enforcement officials who are
173. See id. at 672 (the Supreme Court decided to side step the task of resolving “whether the
Commission’s authority under [Section] 14(e) to “define…such acts and practices as are
fraudulent” is broader than the Commission’s fraud-defining authority under [Section] 10(b).”).
174. See Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 1617 (“…the recent amendments arguably constitute an
authoritative congressional endorsement of the insider trading prohibition. Under the so-called reenactment doctrine, where Congress revises a statute without reversing prior on-point judicial
holdings, that failure has been taken as evidence of congressional approval of those prior
holdings.”).
175. See Kim, supra note 1, at 949 (“To counter serious doctrinal instability and to answer
persistent normative skepticism, we need a better theory of insider trading law.”); see ANDERSON,
supra note 8, at 3 (describing how the “American insider trading enforcement regime is broken,”
Anderson argues that the uncertainty in the law “directly impacts shareholder value and unjustly
leaves market players at the mercy of prosecutorial caprice.”).
176. ANDERSON, supra note 8, at 89.
177. Preet Bharara & Robert J. Jackson Jr., Insider Trading Laws Haven’t Kept Up With the
Crooks, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/09/opinion/sec-insidertrading-united-states.html.
178. Anderson, who describes the doctrine as vague, incoherent, and unjust has argued that
some forms of insider trading should be decriminalized. See ANDERSON, supra note 8, at 235, 243.
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known for penalizing dozens of individuals and organizations under the current
doctrine.179 The consensus that the doctrine is incoherent undermines the
conclusion that the law is stable enough for market participants to rely on past
decisions to have notice of the law. It also warrants viewing Congress’ decision
not to define insider trading in either 1980s statute as more akin to a student
turning in an incomplete assignment, than as an implied endorsement of the
ambiguous status quo.
Whether the Supreme Court will decide to abandon the current interpretations
of Rule 10b-5 or Section 17(a) of the Securities Act in the context of insider
trading is impossible to tell. If the analysis in this Article is correct, however,
and many have missed the property principles animating the doctrine, then the
Court has at least one reason to reconsider its prior decisions.
B. Property And . . . Other Valid Principles
The alternative explanation for the failure of the current insider trading regime
to adhere to property principles is that valid competing principles are also
motivating the doctrine. Most legal regimes contain general rules and exceptions
to those rules. Some exceptions are authorized by an overarching policy
objective that also justifies the general rule. Consider the statute of frauds, which
limits the availability of injunctive relief to those real property transactions that
are reduced to writing.180 The goal of reducing the incidents of fraudulent
transfers by increasing the demands for a certain quality of evidence is clearly
in harmony with the goal of protecting an owner’s rights of exclusive use and
disposal in a parcel of land. Other exceptions to general rules are authorized by
a competing government interest that is given explicit priority in a specific
context. For example, consider conservation laws that prohibit capturing or
selling wild animals that are listed under the Endangered Species Act.181 The

On the other hand, Nagy supports the prohibition and has complained the current doctrine lack
sufficient “coherence and legitimacy.” See Nagy, supra note 43, at 1321.
179. Bharara has often been referred to as the “Sheriff of Wall Street,” and Jackson is a sitting
Securities Exchange Commissioner. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Preet Bharara: ‘Sheriff of Wall
Street’ or Pragmatic Showman?, N.Y. TIMES (March 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
03/13/business/dealbook/preet-bharara-us-attorney-wall-street.html; see also U.S SEC,
BIOGRAPHY, COMMISSIONER ROBERT J. JACKSON JR. https://www.sec.gov/biography/
commissioner-robert-j-jackson.
180. The purpose of the original statute was to prevent individuals from being held responsible
for promises that were never made and were only evidenced by perjured testimonies. See Hugh
Evander Willis, The Statute of Frauds–A Legal Anachronism, 3 IND. L.J. 427, 428n.5 (1928) (citing
the preamble of the original statute as describing its purpose). For a reproduction of the original
statute, see Crawford D. Hening, The Original Drafts of the Statute of Frauds and Their Authors,
61 U. PA. L. REV. 283, 285–287 (1913).
181. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2012).
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Act unambiguously prioritizes the conservation of specific species over the
property principles of acquisition182 and alienation.183
Insider trading doctrine may be best understood as prioritizing a competing
government interest over a general rule aimed at protecting the property rights
of information owners. The starting assumption in insider trading classical
theory cases is that inside information is intended for the exclusive use and
benefit of the issuer and its shareholders. Issuing companies are free to use their
inside information to run their organizations.184 For example, they can use the
information about a planned decrease in their quarterly dividends to execute the
dividend and put cash into the hands of their shareholders. They may also use
the information related to undisclosed merger negotiations to conduct the
diligence and planning necessary to complete the merger. Similarly, the tender
offerors in misappropriation theory cases may use material nonpublic
information about their planned acquisition to successfully take control of a
target company.
Based on this starting assumption, some scholars have argued that the
prohibition on insider trading can be thought of as a means of achieving the
overarching objective of protecting the property rights of issuers and other
sources of information.185 Yet information owners in both classical and
misappropriation theory cases face controlling person liability and treble
damages under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act if their agents engage in
illegal trading—with or without the owner’s consent.186 Because controlling
person liability under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act increases the harm to
the information owner’s property interest, it would not be reasonable to view the
prohibition as an exception aimed at fostering an underlying objective of the
general rule. Moreover, viewing the prohibition as aimed at protecting the
property interests of information owners seems absurd because information
owners are barred by other rules from consenting to the use of the information
in securities trading.
So what competing government interest(s) explains the departures from the
common characteristics of a property regime found in insider trading doctrine?
Fairness and investor confidence are two obvious candidates for the additional
principles in insider trading law that compete with property doctrine. The first
is not simply fairness, but specifically an equal-information conception of
fairness (equal-information fairness). The two-pronged test explaining liability
for insider trading found in Cady, Roberts and Chiarella contains a second
justification for imposing liability, which may have been reaffirmed by the
182. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
183. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 489 cmt. a (1944) (“Property interests are, in
general, alienable.”).
184. For the powers of corporations, see DEL. CODE. ANN. Tit. 8 § 122; MODEL BUSINESS
CORPORATION ACT § 3.02(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
185. See Bainbridge, supra note 1; Jennings, supra note 11; Strudler & Orts, supra note 11.
186. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (2012).
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Supreme Court in O’Hagan.187 In Chiarella, the Court explained that the duty
to disclose or abstain from trading on inside information arose from “(i) the
existence of a relationship affording access to inside information intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a
corporate insider to take advantage of that information by trading without
disclosure.”188
Recall that both common law fraudulent nondisclosure doctrine and trade
secret doctrine seem to be animated by property-based fairness principles.189
Property-based fairness generally requires the consent of the information owner
for a conflicted transaction to be lawful. As a consequences, the disclosure
requirements in fraudulent nondisclosure cases outside of insider trading
facilitate achieving the kind of consent required to ensure that conflicted
transactions do not result in a breach a fiduciary or similar duty of loyalty.190
By contrast, the classical and misappropriation theories of insider trading
abandon consent and make simple disclosure a defense against liability.
Viewing disclosure as sufficient for avoiding liability for insider trading, and not
as a means of obtaining the right kind of consent, suggests that the doctrine is
animated by something other than the protection of property rights. And
focusing on the parties recognized as victims of insider trading may help us to
identify the government interest that has been prioritized over the protection of
the property rights of information owners.
In addition to identifying the information owners as victims, insider trading
legislation and case law also recognizes the counterparties to the trade as the
parties who have been injured by the prohibited trading. The view that an
investor is injured if they trade with counterparties bearing less risk or
counterparties holding more valuable information suggests that the doctrine is
animated by an equal-information or economic equality principle.
The second candidate for an additional principle animating this area of law is
the investor confidence or market integrity rationale offered by the Court in
O’Hagan.191 In O’Hagan, the Court states that imposing liability under the
misappropriation theory is in line with the “animating purpose of the Exchange
Act: to ensure honest securities markets and thereby promoting investor
confidence.”192 The Court acknowledges that some information asymmetries
are inevitable in securities markets. It then goes on to argue that investors are
likely to avoid markets where some participants have misappropriation-derived

187. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228, 230–31 (1980); United States v.
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997).
188. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227.
189. See infra Section III.B.
190. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (AM. LAW INST. 1976).
191. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 658.
192. Id. at 658.
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information advantages, because those advantages stem “from contrivance, not
luck; it is a disadvantage that cannot be overcome with research or skill.”193
It is unclear how the average investor would determine which kind of
information advantages (if any) are being used by his counterparties in the
marketplace.194 This epistemic challenge may explain how the pursuit of some
version of investor confidence through the prohibition of some information
asymmetries might cause departures from long-standing property principles. If
investors would find it difficult to differentiate between counterparties with
acceptable and unacceptable information advantages, then it may be equally
difficult for courts and enforcement officials to do so. Therefore, to the extent
that insider trading doctrine departs from the common elements of a property
regime, the difficulty of precisely differentiating between acceptable and
unacceptable information advantages may have caused the development of
conflicts in the doctrine.
Of course, we do not have to choose only one of these two principles to
explain the departures from a property regime in insider trading doctrine. Recall
that the scholars who rejected the explanatory power of property principles in
insider trading doctrine may have held unnecessarily narrow expectations by
assuming that one rationale would explain the entirety of a doctrine without the
existence of other animating principles.195 If common law nondisclosure and
trade secret doctrines can contain property principles and fairness principles, it
may be possible for insider trading doctrine to contain equal-information
principles and investor confidence principles, while simultaneously being
motivated by property principles. The question becomes whether the many
principles present in the doctrine can operate together harmoniously.
C. Opportunities for Legal Reform
A third implication of property principles animating insider trading doctrine
is that the call for legal reform might be satisfied by bringing the doctrine into
greater harmony with the expected features of a property regime.196
Alternatively, reformers can clearly authorize a departure from the expectations
of a property regime. Section IV.C. describes legal regimes in which general
rules are qualified by either (1) exceptions that are in harmony with some

193. Id. at 658–59.
194. Some scholars have argued that pervasive trading based on information asymmetries
discourages liquidity providers from participating in securities markets, which makes investing less
profitable for the average investor and makes raising capital more expensive for companies. See
Kevin S. Haeberle & M. Todd Henderson, Information-Dissemination Law: The Regulation of How
Market-Moving Information Is Revealed, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1373 (2016).
195. See supra Section II.
196. Preet Bharara et al., The Bharara Task Force on Insider Trading 1 (Jan. 2020),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5e1f2462d354fa5f5bac2699/t/
5e2a1e9d12e0c33aefc41303/1579818654541/Report+of+the+Bharara+Task+Force+on+Insider+
Trading.pdf.
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overarching government interest or (2) exceptions that clearly prioritize a
competing government interest. It is also possible, however, to have a legal
regime in which the general rule is modified by opaquely prioritizing a
competing government interest. This last possibility would likely lead to
confusion on the part of enforcement officials, courts, and civilians; it may also
explain the perceived incoherence of the current insider trading regime.
The equal-information or investor confidence goals discussed above may be
the competing government interest(s) that are opaquely prioritized over a general
rule aimed at protecting the property rights of information owners. A legal
regime cannot protect property—or exclusive use—rights in information while
simultaneously fostering equal access to or use of the same information. The
tension between these two principles may explain why the current doctrine
identifies disclosure by the fiduciary—not the consent of the beneficiary—as a
defense against liability for insider trading. It may also explain why courts have
held issuers in classical theory cases to the same duty to disclose material
information or abstain from trading. Both departures would make sense in a
regime animated by equal access principles, even if liability is often limited to
those defendants who obtained the information through a fiduciary or similar
relationship of trust and confidence. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s explicit
rejection of the equal access rationale in Chiarella would force anyone
committed to information equality to use the opaque prioritization approach.
The confidence of market participants is often fostered by the protection of
property rights—including those rights used to facilitate trading based on
information asymmetries. Still, the courts have concluded that fostering investor
confidence requires prohibiting trading with some information asymmetries
without clarifying the relationship between the kinds of information
asymmetries prohibited and information owners’ exclusive use rights.
Clarifying which, if any, government interests will be prioritized over the
protection of property rights in the regulation of insider trading could solve the
over-inclusiveness problems lurking in two prominent reform proposals. The
current proposals for insider trading reform start with the assumption that the
confusion in the law is rooted in the narrowness of what qualifies as a breach of
the fiduciary duty of loyalty. Many have argued that the duty of loyalty concept
is too narrow, because some defendants were able to avoid liability for trading
with information obtained by hacking into a company’s computers.197 As a
corrective, these proposals recommend statutes that premise liability on the
“wrongful use” of information in securities trading.198 Recognizing the risk of
over-correction by replacing an under-inclusive concept with an over-inclusive
concept, both major proposals define what might constitute “wrongful use.”
Unfortunately, neither proposed clarification will prevent the proposed regimes

197. Donna M. Nagy, Beyond Dirks: Gratuitous Tipping and Insider Trading, 42 IOWA J.
CORP. L. 1, 51–52 (2016).
198. Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987, S. 1380, 100th Cong. (1987).
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from being problematically unambiguous without addressing the role of consent
in the law.
“Consent” is the key issue if officials want to clarify which kind of informed
trading will be deemed wrongful. In addition to the case law presenting
conflicting justifications for insider trading liability, the statutes and rules
regulating the practice express conflicting views of the rights and obligations of
securities market participants. Insider trading cases are primarily brought under
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, Rule 10b-5 and Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act. Outside of insider trading cases, those provisions are applied
using a framework that resembles the common law principles for fraudulent
misrepresentation and fraudulent nondisclosure.199 This means that outside of
insider trading cases, when defendants face liability for fraudulent nondisclosure
under Rule 10b-5 and 17(a) it is because by failing to make the appropriate
disclosures they failed to obtain the right kind of consent.200
At least two Supreme Court decisions tried to revitalize the principle of
consent in insider trading cases, but without using the word. In Chiarella, both
the Court and the SEC acknowledged that a tender offeror could authorize
friendly investors to purchase stock in a target company ahead of a public
announcement of the offer without violating Rule 10b-5.201 In Dirks, the
majority warned against over-inclusive restrictions on trading with information
advantages, because the approach would prevent issuers from engaging in
selective disclosure of valuable information when doing so was beneficial to the
company.202 Nevertheless, the SEC adoption of Regulation FD203 and Rule 14e3204 make it unlawful for information owners to consent to the use of their
information for securities trading. These rules were described by the SEC as
being aimed at closing loopholes in the regulation of insider trading.
Combined with the case law that penalizes issuers in classical theory cases for
trading on their own information, the rejection of consent in Regulation FD and
Rule 14e-3 make the current insider trading regime operate more like
inalienability rules or vice laws, than like property rules. Combined with the case
law and statutory provisions rooting the authority to impose liability for insider
trading in the violation of some party’s property rights in information, the
inalienability features in insider trading doctrine make the regime unnecessarily
confusing. Reformers can solve this problem by using consent to define the
outer limits of their proposed wrongful use principle. If insider trading
defendants can avoid liability by obtaining consent or ratification from the
information owner, then market participants will know that property and related

199.
200.
201.
202.
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204.

See supra Section II.D.
See supra Section II.D.
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980).
Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 17 C.F.R. § 243 (2000).
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principles are controlling the regime.205 If neither consent nor ratification are
defenses against insider trading liability, then market participants will know that
some other government interest has been prioritized.
Solidifying the role of consent in the doctrine also be helpful in the event that
the “wrongful use” proposals fail. Some want the regulation of insider trading
to focus on fostering some form of “economic efficiency.” Others want the
regulation to focus on fostering “fairness.” Like “wrongful,” all terms
expressing evaluations can be used to convey dramatically different ideas and
therefore used to reach substantially different conclusions based on the term’s
underlying standard of evaluation. Would a fairness approach aim for economic
equality or for an economy based on consent? Would an economic efficiency
approach chose to use property rules or inalienability rules to protect
entitlements to information?
Of course, the proposed reform assumes that law makers would want to make
the insider trading regime less ambiguous.206
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has shown that the SEC and federal courts have always premised
liability for insider trading on the violation of some party’s property rights under
the classical theory of liability. Most scholars recognize that the U.S. Supreme
Court premises liability for insider trading on a breaches of fiduciary duty in
classical theory cases. Unfortunately, many scholars draw unnecessarily strict
distinctions between property doctrine and other doctrines—i.e., fraud, fiduciary
duty, fairness, or disclosure doctrines. Because they are often searching for the
one best rationale to explain insider trading doctrine, many have missed the fact
that the fiduciary duty of loyalty at work in all insider trading cases involves the
duty to use corporate assets—including confidential business information—for
the sole benefit of the corporation and its shareholders. Therefore, liability in
these cases is not premised on property principles or fairness principles or duty
of loyalty principles. Liability in these cases is premised on property and other
principles.
Recognizing the undeniable presence of property principles in insider trading
doctrine is no reason to treat property as the best rationale for explaining past
cases or as the best rationale for deciding tough cases in the future. Yet
acknowledging property principles does raise doubts about whether officials are
authorized to impose liability for insider trading. However, recognizing
property principles also highlights possible solutions for the confusion in the
doctrine that many scholars and enforcement officials lament. At a minimum,

205. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 606 (1938); see also ERIC R. CLAEYS, ON THE
“PROPERTY” AND THE “TORT” IN TRESPASS in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF
TORTS (John Oberdick ed. 2014).
206. See Jill E. Fisch, Constructive Ambiguity and Judicial Development of Insider Trading,
71 SMU L. REV 750 (2018).
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reformers interested in eliminating unnecessary ambiguity must clarify the role
of consent in their reform proposals.

